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Abstract
This paper shows how to solve dynamic agency models by extending recursive La-
grangean techniques à la Marcet and Marimon (2011) to problems with hidden actions.
The method has many advantages with respect to promised utilities approach (Abreu,
Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990)): it is a significant improvement in terms of simplic-
ity, tractability and computational speed. Solutions can be easily computed for hidden
actions models with several endogenous state variables and several agents, while the
promised utilities approach becomes extremely difficult and computationally intensive
even with just one state variable or two agents.
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1 Introduction
This paper shows how to solve repeated moral hazard models using recursive Lagrangean
techniques. In particular, this approach can be used in the analysis of dynamic hidden-actions
models with several endogenous state variables and many agents. While these models are
extremely complicated to solve with commonly used solution strategies, my methodology is
simpler and numerically faster than the alternatives.
The recent literature on dynamic principal-agent models is vast1. These models do not
usually have closed form solutions, and they must be solved numerically. The most popular
method is the promised utilities approach due to Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990) (APS
henceforth). However, this approach is very challenging, if not infeasible, for models with
either several agents or many state variables. Therefore, if we use this approach, a large class
of models cannot be analyzed even with numerical methods.
This paper provides a way to overcome the limits of the APS technique: under assump-
tions that justify the use of the first-order approach, it extends the recursive Lagrangean tech-
niques developed in Marcet and Marimon (2011) (MM henceforth) to dynamic agency mod-
els. These techniques are well understood and widely used for full information problems of
optimal policy and enforcement frictions, but MM do not analyze their applicability to en-
vironments with private information. Sleet and Yeltekin (2008) make a crucial contribution
in applying recursive Lagrangean techniques to dynamic models with privately observed id-
iosyncratic preference shocks. This paper instead focuses on a particular class of dynamic
models with hidden actions, i.e. models that admit the use of the first-order approach.
In order to illustrate the method, a dynamic principal-agent model such as the one in
Spear and Srivastava (1987), where no endogenous state variables are present, is presented in
section 2. As Rogerson (1985b) highlighted, these models exhibit history dependence, and
therefore a standard Bellman equation representation is not possible, with the consequence
of not being able to use dynamic programming techniques. The recursive Lagrangean ap-
proach allows a “recursification” of the problem, and has a straightforward interpretation:
the optimal contract can be characterized by maximizing a weighted sum of the lifetime util-
ities of the principal and the agent (i.e., a utilitarian social welfare function), where in each
period the social planner optimally updates the weight of the agent in order to enforce an
incentive compatible allocation. This Pareto-Negishi weight2 becomes the new state variable
1Many contributions have focused on the case in which agent’s consumption is observable (see for example
Rogerson (1985b), Spear and Srivastava (1987), Thomas and Worrall (1990), Phelan and Townsend (1991),
Fernandes and Phelan (2000)) and more recently on the case in which agents can secretly save and borrow
(Abraham and Pavoni (2008)); other works have explored what happens in presence of more than one agent
(see e.g. Zhao (2007) and Friedman (1998)), while few researchers have extended the setup to production
economies with capital (Clementi, Cooley, and Giannatale (2010)). Among applications, a non-exhaustive
list includes unemployment insurance (Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997), Shimer and Werning (2008), Pavoni
(2007), Pavoni (2009)), executive compensation (Clementi, Cooley, and Giannatale (2010), Clementi, Coo-
ley, and Wang (2006), Atkeson and Cole (2005)), entrepreneurship Quadrini (2004), Paulson, Townsend, and
Karaivanov (2006)), credit markets (Lehnert, Ligon, and Townsend (1999)), and many more.
2Chien and Lustig (2010) use the term "Pareto-Negishi weight" in a model of an endowment economy with
limited enforcement, where agents face both aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks. In their work, the weight of
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that "recursifies" the dynamic agency problem. In particular, this endogenously evolving
weight summarizes the contract’s promises according to which the agent is rewarded or pun-
ished. Imagine, for simplicity, that there are only two possible realizations for the state of
nature, either "good" or "bad". The contract promises that, if tomorrow "good" is observed,
the Pareto-Negishi weight will increase, therefore the principal will care more about the ex-
pected discounted utility of the agent from tomorrow on. Analogously, if a "bad" outcome
happens, the Pareto-Negishi weight will decrease, hence the principal will care less about the
expected discounted utility of the agent from tomorrow on. Hence, the contract rewards the
agent for “good” realizations, and punishes him for “bad” ones. An optimal contract chooses
the sequence of Pareto-Negishi weights (i.e., rewards and punishments) that implements an
incentive compatible allocation.
The APS approach, instead, would "recursify" the problem by using the agent’s contin-
uation value as an auxiliary state variable. At each point in time, the agent’s continuation
value incorporates the past promises made by the contract to the agent, and by keeping track
of those promises the principal has all the information he needs to give the right incentives to
the agents in the current period. Analogously to the Lagrangean formulation with two pos-
sible contingencies, future continuation values increase if “good” is observed, and decrease
otherwise. However, in order to make sure the continuation values are consistent with the
original problem, a feasible set for them must be characterized before solving the dynamic
program. This additional step is the main difference between the two approaches, and it is the
reason why APS becomes intractable for models with many state variables. While in Spear
and Srivastava (1987)’s model this set is easy to characterize, the task becomes exponentially
more complicated if we increase the dimensionality of the state space.
The basic logic of the Lagrangean approach is applied to a more general class of dynamic
agency problems with several agents and several observable endogenous state variables in
section 3. Under the Lagrangean approach, the dynamic optimization problem has a recursive
formulation based on the Pareto-Negishi weights of the agents, and the endogenous state
variables from the original problem. These weights are updated in each period to enforce an
incentive compatible allocation, while the endogenous states follow their own law of motion.
In this more general class of models, the additional APS step makes a big difference for
computational purposes. In the recursive Lagrangean approach, the social welfare function
maximization problem is well defined for any non-negative real-valued weight3. Therefore,
for any original dynamic agency model it is possible to characterize the optimal allocation
with the recursive Lagrangean, provided that we make sure the Pareto-Negishi weights are
non-negative4. However, with APS it might be impossible even to characterize the feasible
set for the dynamic program. In fact, given an endogenous state space of dimension D for
each agent and N agents, it is easy to show that the feasible set for continuation values
each agent evolves stochastically in order to keep track of occasionally binding enforcement constraints. Sleet
and Yeltekin use the same terminology in their papers.
3This is also valid for the recursive Lagrangeans approach in dynamic optimization problems with full
information and limited enforcement. For a discussion of this issue, see Marcet and Marimon (2011).
4Usually some form of the Inada condition guarantees that the weights are always positive.
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has dimension N(D + 1)5, and its characterization might be extremely time consuming or
infeasible even for small D and/or N . While in principle the Lagrangean approach can deal
with models with tens of state variables and agents6, APS would require an unreasonable
amount of CPU time in such cases, even with the efficient techniques developed by Sleet
and Yeltekin (2007). Moreover, for models that have been solved with APS, the Lagrangean
approach would save computational and coding time and therefore it might be a more suitable
choice for calibration purposes.
There is a second and subtler reason for which the Lagrangean approach is more effi-
cient7, and it has to do with the number of choice variables and the number of constraints
involved in the dynamic program. Imagine there are I possible exogenous states of nature,
and N agents. For each point in the state space, both approaches require computing allo-
cations and endogenous states. However, both methods also need to compute the auxiliary
state variables that recursify the problem. In APS one has to calculate N × I continuation
values (one for each agent and for each future state of nature). In the Lagrangean approach
instead, calculation of the N values of the current Lagrange multipliers deliver the full set of
future Pareto-Negishi weights. In addition to that, any APS problem has N constraints (the
promise keeping constraint for each agent, which are needed to keep track of past and future
promises) which are absent in the Lagrangean approach. Summarizing, at each iteration of
the dynamic programming algorithm, the APS maximization has to characterize N(I − 1)
additional variables under N additional constraints. As the number of agents or the number
of states of nature grows, the APS program becomes much more difficult to solve than the
Lagrangean one. Therefore, even if we can characterize the APS feasible set for continuation
values, the Lagrangean approach is still more efficient8.
This paper also propose an efficient way to compute the optimal contract based on the
theoretical results. The idea is to find approximated policy functions by solving Lagrangean
first-order conditions. The procedure is an application of the collocation method (see Judd
(1998)). The algorithm is simple: firstly, approximate the policy functions for allocations,
Lagrange multipliers, agents’ and principal’s continuation values over a set of grid nodes,
with standard interpolation techniques, either splines or Chebychev polynomials depending
on the particular application. Then look for the coefficients of these approximated policy
functions that satisfy Lagrangean first-order conditions. The gain in terms of computational
speed is large. As an example, a risk sharing problem with moral hazard with two agents
5In other words, the feasible set for continuation values is a correspondence that maps sets of the natural
state space (i.e. the state variables of the original problem) into feasible continuation values’ sets. For Spear
and Srivastava (1987)’s model, this feasible set is an interval, and therefore its characterization is a simple, if
not trivial, numerical task. However, in more complicated setups, we will need to characterize an interval for
each agent and each value of the natural state space, therefore exponentially increasing the complexity of the
numerical problem.
6The numerical algorithm proposed in this paper is based on projection techniques and therefore the ideas
in Judd, Maliar, and Maliar (2010) can be applied to solve models with many agents and states. In their paper,
Judd, Maliar, and Maliar (2010) solve models with hundreds of agents.
7I would like to thank an anonymous referee for bringing this point to my attention.
8As the anonymous referee pointed out, this is a feature widely exploited in the literature with full informa-
tion and limited commitment.
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in a production economy is solved. This model has 5 state variables, and therefore it is at
the limit of reach of APS techniques. A Matlab code finds the solution in short time (a
matter of minutes) with good accuracy, even with a relatively coarse grid. Therefore, models
that are extremely challenging with APS become easy and fast to solve with the Lagrangean
approach. This opens the doors for exploration of a large class of dynamic agency setups that
were reputed too complicated even for numerical analysis.
Recent work on the Lagrangean approach includes Messner, Pavoni, and Sleet (2013) and
Cole and Kubler (2012). The first proposes a more general Lagrangean approach to dynamic
problems with incentive constraints that can be applied to a very large class of models, in-
cluding the ones presented in this paper. The crucial differences lie in the state space used
to derive recursivity, and in the techniques to characterize contractivity of the recursive dual
problem. For the first, they include laws of motion of natural state variables in the Lagrangean
by assigning a Lagrange multiplier to each of them, and then they only rely on Lagrange
multipliers (or functions of Lagrange multipliers) for the recursive characterization. This is
different from the strategy followed here (and in Marcet and Marimon (2011)) where "natu-
ral" state variables of the original problem are included together with Pareto weights derived
from Lagrange multipliers, and recursivity is recovered in this enlarged state space9. For the
second, they show contractivity by bounding the value function of the dual problem between
two “sandwich” functions, and using the fact that the value function is convex. Messner,
Pavoni, and Sleet (2013) make use of recent results in convex analysis with weaker assump-
tions on the primitives of the model, and therefore their approach is applicable to a larger
class of setups, and in particular it is able to solve models that cannot be dealt with MM-like
techniques. While this is an important theoretical result per se, their approach does not imply
any specific computational advantage with respect to the one presented in this paper: their
recursive problem has the same state space dimensionality as mine.
Cole and Kubler (2012) instead focus on solving models with flat spots on the Pareto
frontier. In these cases, the MM approach fails to determine a unique policy function, even
if the value of the problem is unique. Cole and Kubler (2012) propose to select the optimal
policy by using an additional state variable, which is the realization of a end-of-period lottery
over the extreme values on the flat part of the Pareto frontier. This approach thus combines
aspects of MM and APS together. An alternative to it is Marimon, Messner, and Pavoni
(2011), which extends MM method to problems lacking concavity (and therefore suffering
from non-uniqueness of the policy function) by using the sign of the last period Lagrange
multipliers as additional costates. In this paper I assume uniqueness of the policy function for
simplicity of exposition, however it is straightforward to apply the suggestions of Marimon,
Messner, and Pavoni (2011) for cases in which uniqueness fails.
9As an example, in a model with capital accumulation my approach would use capital as a state, while
Messner, Pavoni, and Sleet (2013) would treat the law of motion for capital as a constraint and use the Lagrange
multiplier associated with it as a state variable
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2 An illustration with a simple dynamic agency model
Sleet and Yeltekin (2008) has shown how to extend MM’s ideas to dynamic economies with
hidden shocks10. However, many economic situations can be better represented as dynamic
principal-agent relationship: unemployment insurance, worker’s compensation, bank lend-
ing, etc. It turns out that the MM arguments apply to these economies too.
In order to illustrate the Lagrangean approach, it is easier to start with a dynamic agency
problem without endogenous states, as in Spear and Srivastava (1987). Theirs is an infinitely
repeated version of a standard moral hazard problem, in which a risk neutral principal hires a
risk averse agent to perform a task subject to uncertainty for infinitely many periods. The out-
put of the task is observable, but the effort that the agent puts in the process is not. Therefore,
the principal must structure the sequence of payments to the agent in order to preserve incen-
tives to put high effort. To do that, the agent bears part of the risk involved in the uncertain
output.
Time is discrete, and the state of the world follows an observable Markov process {st}∞t=0,
where st ∈ S, and card(S) = I . The realizations of the process are public information.
Denote the single realizations with subscripts, and the histories with superscripts:
st ≡ {s0, ..., st} ∈ St+1
In each period, the agent produces a state-contingent income flow y (st), enjoys consumption
ct (s
t), receives a transfer τt (st) from the principal, and exerts a costly unobservable action
at (s
t) ∈ A ⊆ R+, and A is bounded. I will refer to at (st) as action or effort.
The costly action affects the future probability distribution of the state of the world. For
simplicity, let ŝi, i = 1, 2, ..., I be the possible realizations of {st} and let them be ordered
such that y (st = ŝ1) < y (st = ŝ2) < ... < y (st = ŝI). Let pi (st+1 = ŝi | st, at (st)) be
the probability that state tomorrow is ŝi ∈ S conditional on past state and effort exerted by
the agent at the beginning of the period11, with pi (s0 = ŝI) = 1. Assume pi (·) is twice
continuously differentiable in at (st) with
pia(·)
pi(·) uniformly bounded, and has full support:
pi (st+1 = ŝi | st, a) > 0 ∀i, ∀a, ∀st. Let Π (st+1 | s0, at (st)) =
∏t
j=0 pi (sj+1 | sj, aj (sj))
be the probability of history st+1 induced by the history of unobserved actions at (st) ≡
(a0 (s
0) , a1 (s
1) , ..., at (s
t)).
The instantaneous utility of the agents is
u
(
ct
(
st
))− υ (at (st))
10This paper is different from Sleet and Yeltekin (2008) in two aspects, besides the focus on a different type
of private information. Firstly, the structure of the hidden shocks framework is such that Sleet and Yeltekin
(2008) can use recursive Lagrangeans directly on the original problem without need of a first-order approach.
Secondly, they mainly focus on theoretical aspects of the method, while this paper mostly aims at providing
an efficient way of characterizing the numerical solution. A third and minor difference is technical: they do
not exploit the homogeneity of the value and policy functions, which is crucial in my proof strategy and in
numerical applications. Their work is complementary to this paper in the analysis of dynamic models with
asymmetric information.
11Notice that shocks can be persistent.
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with u (·) strictly increasing, strictly concave and satisfying Inada conditions, while υ (·) is
strictly increasing and strictly convex; both are twice continuously differentiable. The instan-
taneous utility is uniformly bounded. The agent does not accumulate assets autonomously:
the only source of insurance is the principal. The budget constraint of the agent will be simply
ct
(
st
)
= y (st) + τt
(
st
) ∀st, t ≥ 0.
and ct (st) ∈ C ⊆ R+, with C bounded. Both principal and agent are fully committed once
they sign the contract at time zero.
A feasible contract (or allocation)W in this framework is a plan (a∞, c∞, τ∞) ≡ {at (st) , ct (st) , τt (st)
∀st ∈ St+1}∞t=0 that belongs to the following set:
ΓMH ≡ {(a∞, c∞, τ∞) : at (st) ∈ A, ct (st) ∈ C,
τt
(
st
)
= ct
(
st
)− y (st) ∀st ∈ St+1, t ≥ 0} .
Assume, for simplicity, that the agent and the principal have the same discount factor. The
principal evaluates allocations according to the following
P (s0;a
∞, c∞, τ∞) = −
∞∑
t=0
∑
st
βtτt
(
st
)
Π
(
st | s0, at−1
(
st−1
))
=
∞∑
t=0
∑
st
βt
[
y (st)− ct
(
st
)]
Π
(
st | s0, at−1
(
st−1
))
(1)
therefore the principal can characterize efficient contracts by maximizing (1), subject to in-
centive compatibility and to the requirement of providing at least a minimum level of ex-ante
utility V out to the agent:
W (s0) = max{at(st),ct(st)}∞t=0∈ΓMH
∞∑
t=0
∑
st
βt
[
y (st)− ct
(
st
)]
Π
(
st | s0, at−1
(
st−1
))
s.t. a∞ ∈ arg max
{at(st)}∞t=0
∞∑
t=0
∑
st
βt
[
u
(
ct
(
st
))− υ (at (st))]Π (st | s0, at−1 (st−1))
(2)
∞∑
t=0
∑
st
βt
[
u
(
ct
(
st
))− υ (at (st))]Π (st | s0, at−1 (st−1)) ≥ V out. (3)
Constraint (3) assumes there is an exogenous value V out that the agent would get if she
decides not to get into a contractual relationship with the principal. Hence V out can be inter-
preted as a reservation value for the agent in order to sign the contract.
Assume that the agent’s maximization problem is a concave program. Hence it has an
interior solution for effort for which first-order conditions are necessary and sufficient, and
they hold with equality. We can therefore substitute the constraint (2) with the first order
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conditions with respect to effort. The agent, given the principal’s strategy profile τ∞ ≡
{τt (st)}∞t=0 , solves
V (s0; τ
∞) = max
{ct(st),at(st)}∞t=0∈ΓMH
{ ∞∑
t=0
∑
st
βt
[
u
(
ct
(
st
))− υ (at (st))]Π (st | s0, at−1 (st−1))} .
The first order condition for effort is, for every st ∈ St+1
υ′
(
at
(
st
) )
=
∞∑
j=1
βj
∑
st+j |st
pia
(
st+1 | st, at
(
st
))× (4)
× [u (ct+j (st+j))− υ (at+j (st+j))]Π (st+j | st+1, at+j (st+j | st+1)) .
Intuitively, the marginal cost of effort today (LHS) has to be equal to future expected bene-
fits (RHS) in terms of expected future utility. Those expected benefits are defined over the
entire future histories: today’s effort affects directly the distribution of tomorrow’s states,
and indirectly (given independence across time) the distribution of future states of nature
from tomorrow onwards. The use of (4) is crucial, since it allows to write the Lagrangean
of the principal’s problem. In the following, for simplicity I refer to (4) as the incentive-
compatibility constraint (ICC).
It is trivial to show that (3) must be binding in the optimum. Given this consideration, the
planner’s problem can be seen as the constrained maximization of a social welfare function,
where the Pareto weight for the principal and the agent are, respectively, 1 and γ:
W SWF (s0) = max{at(st),ct(st)}∞t=0∈ΓMH
∞∑
t=0
∑
st
βt
[
y (st)− ct
(
st
)]
Π
(
st | s0, at−1
(
st−1
))
+
+ γ
∞∑
t=0
∑
st
βt
[
u
(
ct
(
st
))− υ (at (st))]Π (st | s0, at−1 (st−1))
(5)
s.t. υ′
(
at
(
st
) )
=
∞∑
j=1
βj
∑
st+j |st
pia (st+1 | st, at (st))
pi (st+1 | st, at (st)) ×
× [u (ct+j (st+j))− υ (at+j (st+j))]Π (st+j | st, at+j−1 (st+j−1 | st)) ∀st ∈ St+1
where γ is a function of V out in the original problem12, and equation (4) has been rearranged
by using the definition of the cumulative probability of a history. Let βtλt (st) Π (st | s0, at−1 (st−1))
12 To see how we can rewrite the original problem as a social welfare maximization, notice that equation (3)
must be binding in the optimum: otherwise, the principal can increase her expected discounted utility by asking
the agent to increase effort in period 0 by δ > 0, provided that δ is small enough. Therefore, we can associate a
strictly positive Lagrange multiplier (say, γ) to (3), which will be a function of V out. This Lagrange multiplier
can be seen as a Pareto-Negishi weight on the agent’s utility. I can fully characterize the Pareto frontier of this
economy by solving the problem for different values of γ between zero and infinity. Moreover, notice that by
fixing γ, V out will appear in the Lagrangean only in the constant term γV out, thus it will be irrelevant for the
optimal allocation and can be dropped.
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be the Lagrange multiplier associated to each ICC. The Lagrangean, with some simple alge-
bra and the use of Abel’s formula13, yields the following expression:
L (s0, γ,c
∞, a∞, λ∞) =
∞∑
t=0
∑
st
βt
{
y (st)− ct
(
st
)
+ φt
(
st
) [
u
(
ct
(
st
))− υ (at (st))]+
−λt
(
st
)
υ′
(
at
(
st
))}
Π
(
st | s0, at−1
(
st−1
))
where
φt
(
st−1, st
)
= γ +
t−1∑
i=0
λi
(
si
) pia (si+1 | si, ai (si))
pi (si+1 | si, ai (si))
The intuition is simple. For any st, λt (st) is the shadow cost of implementing an incentive
compatible allocation, i.e. the amount of resources that the principal must spend to implement
an incentive compatible contract. The expression
pia(st+1|st,at(st))
pi(st+1|st,at(st)) is the likelihood ratio and
is a measure of the effect of effort on the observed output. In order to better grasp the role of
the newly defined variable φt, rewrite the previous expression as:
φt+1
(
st, ŝ
)
= φt
(
st
)
+ λt
(
st
) pia (st+1 = ŝ | st, at (st))
pi (st+1 = ŝ | st, at (st)) ∀s
t ∈ St+1,∀ŝ ∈ S (6)
φ0
(
s0
)
= γ
Therefore, from (6) we can see φt (st) as the Pareto-Negishi weight of the agent’s lifetime
utility, that evolves endogenously in order to track the agent’s effort. The optimal contract
promises that the weight in t + 1 will differ from the weight in t by an amount equal to the
shadow cost of the ICC λt (st) multiplied by a measure of the effect of effort on the output
distribution. In order to fix ideas, imagine there are only two possible realizations of the
shock, "good" and "bad", where the output is higher in the "good" state than in the "bad"
state. In that case, it is easy to prove that the likelihood ratio
pia(st+1|st,at(st))
pi(st+1|st,at(st)) is positive for
the "good" state, and negative for the "bad" state. In other words, given that λt (st) is always
positive14, after each history the planner observes the current realization of the shock: if it is
"good" (resp. "bad"), then it rewards the agent by increasing (resp. decreasing) the Pareto-
Negishi weight by the marginal benefit (resp. cost) that the principal bears because of the
change in the distribution of future histories that his hidden effort has caused.
Equation (6) also suggests the possibility of having a recursive formulation of the prob-
lem in an enlarged state space that includes φt (st). If this intuition is right, then we can apply
standard dynamic programming methods for this optimization problem. In the next section,
this is formalized in a more general setup with several agents and endogenous observable
states. Recursivity of the Lagrangean is proven for this wider class of models that nest the
13Abel’s formula states that
∑∞
t=0 at (
∑∞
s=0 bt+s) =
∑∞
t=0
(∑t
s=0 as
)
bt and notice that, by defining µt ≡(∑t
s=0 as
)
we can write µt+1 = µt + at.
14This fact is a well known result for an interior solution due to Rogerson (1985a).
9
setup presented in this section as a special case. Given recursivity, the Lagrangean problem
is easy to solve: if well behaved, we can use Lagrangean first order conditions to character-
ize the optimal contract. In other words, under assumptions that justify the substitution of
the original incentive compatibility constraint (2) with the agent’s first order conditions with
respect to effort, this dynamic agency problem can be easily solved with standard compu-
tational techniques. In fact, this is a problem with just one endogenous state variable (φt)
and one shock, and therefore at the same level of difficulty of the simplest stochastic growth
model.
3 Dynamic economies with moral hazard
The same line of reasoning can be applied to a more general class of dynamic agency models
with several agents and several endogenous state variables. This section describes the class of
models of interest, and derives a recursive formulation of the contractual problem. Notably,
this class of models is suitable for heterogeneous agents and for general equilibrium analysis.
For this purpose, we are going to assume that all the assumptions in MM are satisfied. In the
following, when needed, other assumptions on the primitives of the model will be specified.
There are N agents15 indexed by i = 1, ..., N . Each agent is subject to an observ-
able Markov state process {sit}∞t=0, where sit ∈ Si, si0 is known, and the process is com-
mon knowledge. The process is independent across agents. Let S ≡ N×
i=1
Si and st ≡
{s1t, ..., sNt} ∈ S be the state of nature in the economy, let st ≡ {s0, ..., st} be the his-
tory of these realizations. Let wt (st) ≡ (w1t (st) , ..., wNt (st)) for any generic variable w,
and let W =
N×
i=1
Wi for any generic set W .
Each agent exerts a costly action ait (st) ∈ Ai, where Ai is a convex closed subset of R+.
This action is unobservable to other players, and it affects the next period distribution of states
of nature. Let pii (si,t+1 | sit, ait (st)) be the probability that state is si,t+1 conditional on both
the past state and the effort exerted by the agent i in period t. Therefore, since the processes
are independent across agents, define Π (st+1 | s0, at (st)) =
∏N
i=1
∏t
j=0 pi
i (si,j+1 | sij, aij (sj))
to be the cumulated probability of history st+1 given the whole history of unobserved actions
at (st) ≡ (a0 (s0) , a1 (s1) , ..., at (st)). Notice that a change in the action profile at (st) affects
all the cumulated probabilities of histories that follow the change. In other words, if agent i
changes his action ait (st), then the distribution of states of nature for any subsequent history
{st+j}∞j=1 is shifted. In this assumption rests the intertemporal nature of the moral hazard
problem.
Probabilities pii (si,t+1 | sit, ait (st)) are continuosly differentiable in ait (st) as many time
as necessary. Denote the derivative with respect to ait (st) as piia (si,t+1 | sit, ait (st)), and as-
sume the likelihood ratio (i.e.,
piia(si,t+1|sit,ait(st))
pii(si,t+1|sit,ait(st)) ) is uniformly bounded with
∥∥∥∥piia(si,t+1|sit,ait(st))pii(si,t+1|sit,ait(st))
∥∥∥∥ ≤
15Extension of the arguments for the case with a continuum of agents is straightforward and available upon
request. For expositional purposes, it is easier to present the case with finite number of agents, since all measure
theoretic details are avoided.
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D for some D ∈ R+. Allocations are indicated by the vector ςit (st) ∈ Υi. Each agent is
endowed with a vector of endogenous state variables xit (st) ∈ Xi, Xi ⊆ Rm convex, that
evolve according to the following laws of motion:
xi,t+1
(
st, st+1
)
= `i
(
xit
(
st
)
, ςit
(
st
)
, si,t+1
)
This is a general and standard formulation for the law of motion of endogenous states in many
dynamic macroeconomic models with several agents and idiosyncratic shocks. In particular,
the assumption is that only variables under the control of agent i, or its own idiosyncratic
shock, can affect the sequence xit.
The (uniformly bounded) per-period payoff function of each agent is given by
ri (ςi, ai, xi, s)
and ri : Υi × Ai × Xi × S → R is non-decreasing in ςi, decreasing in ai, concave in xi
and strictly concave in (ςi, ai), (at least) once continuously differentiable in (ςi, xi) and twice
continuously differentiable in ai. The resource constraint is 16:
p
(
xt
(
st
)
, ςt
(
st
)
, at
(
st
)
, st
) ≥ 0
A feasible contractW is a triplet of sequences (ς∞, a∞, x∞) ≡ {ςt (st) , at (st) , xt (st)}∞t=0
∀st ∈ St+1 that belongs to the set:
ΓGT ≡ {(ς∞, a∞, x∞) : at (st) ∈ A, ςt (st) ∈ Υ, xt (st) ∈ X,
xi,t+1
(
st, st+1
)
= `i
(
xit
(
st
)
, ςit
(
st
)
, si,t+1
) ∀i,
p
(
xt
(
st
)
, ςt
(
st
)
, at
(
st
)
, st
) ≥ 0 ∀st ∈ St+1, t ≥ 0}
Let ω ≡ {ωi}Ni=1 ∈ RN be a vector of initial Pareto-Negishi weights. The contractual problem
is therefore
P (x0, s0) = maxW∈ΓGT
{
N∑
i=1
∞∑
t=0
βt
∑
st
ωir
i (ςit, ait, xit, st) Π
(
st | s0, at−1
)}
(7)
s.t. {ait}∞t=0 ∈ arg max{a˜it}∞t=0
∞∑
t=0
βt
∑
st
ri (ςit, a˜it, xit, st) Π
(
st | s0, at−1
) ∀i (8)
The optimal contract maximizes the weighted sum of individual lifetime payoffs. The con-
straints (8) make sure that the contract keeps into account that, given a contract, agents choose
hidden actions’ profiles that maximize their payoffs, i.e. they optimally respond to the incen-
tives that the contract gives them.
16Constraints that involve future endogenous variables, like participation constraints or Euler equations, can
be incorporated by following the standard MM approach. Since they only complicate the notation, they are not
included in the analysis.
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Call the program (7)-(8) the original problem. If each agent’s optimization problem is
well-behaved, the sequence of constraints (8) can be characterized by the corresponding first-
order conditions. In that case, it is possible to use the agent’s first-order conditions as con-
straints in the dynamic contract problem. This solution strategy is commonly known in the
literature as the first-order approach (FOA). For the simple principal-agent model in Section
2 there are well known sufficient conditions that guarantee that the problem with first-order
conditions as constraints is equivalent to the original problem, and therefore delivers the same
solution. It is easy to see that in the more general framework presented here, those same con-
ditions are also sufficient, and therefore for the rest of this section assume that Rogerson
(1985a) conditions of monotone likelihood ratio (MLRC) and convexity of the distribution
(CDFC) are satisfied for each agent17.
Since FOA is valid, we can use the first-order conditions of the agents’ problems with
respect to hidden actions as incentive compatibility constraints:
ria (ςit, ait, xit, st) +
∞∑
j=1
∑
st+j
βj
piia (si,t+1 | sit, ait)
pii (si,t+1 | sit, ait)×
× ri (ςi,t+j, ai,t+j, xi,t+j, st+j) Π
(
st+j | st+j−1, at+j−1) = 0 ∀i = 1, ..., N, ∀st ∈ St+1
(9)
where ria (ςit, ait, xit, st) is the derivative of the per-period payoff function with respect to the
hidden action. The intuition behind equation (9) is straightforward: the current cost (in terms
of lower instantaneous payoff) that a marginal increase in the hidden action implies must be
compensated by a marginal increase in the benefits from it. Those benefits are obtained by
the higher likelihood of future "good" realizations of the state of nature (since higher a shifts
the distribution of the states of nature towards better outcomes for any future history ), which
increases the expected discounted lifetime utility from t+ 1 onwards. Hence, the constrained
efficient allocation is the solution of the following maximization problem:
P (s0) = maxW∈ΓGT
{
N∑
i=1
∞∑
t=0
βt
∑
st
ωir
i (ςit, ait, xit, st) Π
(
st | s0, at−1
)}
s.t. (9)
Let βtλit (st) Π (st | s0, at−1) be the Lagrange multiplier for the incentive-compatibility con-
straint (9) of agent i. Substitute for the resource constraint and use Abel’s formula to write
the Lagrangean as:
L (s0, ω,W , λ∞) =
N∑
i=1
∞∑
t=0
∑
st
βt
{
φitr
i (ςit, ait, xit, st) +
+λitr
i
a (ςit, ait, xit, st)
}
Π
(
st | s0, at−1
)
(10)
17For static principal-agent models, Jewitt (1988) provides another set of sufficient conditions, which can be
used in alternative to Rogerson’s to guarantee the feasibility of a first-order approach. Both Rogerson’s and
Jewitt’s conditions are sufficient for dynamic agency setups with observable endogenous states. Ke (2013) sug-
gests a fixed-point condition that justifies the first-order approach in static environments, which can potentially
also be used in dynamic settings.
12
where, for any i and any st ∈ St+1,
xi,t+1
(
st, st+1
)
= `i
(
xit
(
st
)
, ςit
(
st
)
, si,t+1
)
φi,t+1
(
st, st+1
)
= φit
(
st
)
+ λit
(
st
) piia (si,t+1 | sit, ait (st))
pii (si,t+1 | sit, ait (st)) (11)
φi0 (s0) = ωi, xi0 given (12)
The newly defined variables φit (st), i = 1, ..., N , are endogenously evolving Pareto-Negishi
weights which are optimally chosen by the planner to implement an incentive compatible
allocation and they summarize the contract’s (history-dependent) promises for each agent.
The intuition is the same as in Section 2. Given the weight inherited from previous period,
the optimal contract rewards or punishes the agent by increasing or decreasing its weight
in the next period by an amount that internalizes the externality produced by moral hazard.
Thus, the weight summarizes the history of past promises (either rewards or punishments),
and it is then natural to consider φt (st) as a probable sufficient statistic that can make the
problem recursive: given the current value for the Pareto weight, the planner can choose
current allocations and future Pareto weights that solve the maximization. A formal proof of
this intuition is obtained in the next subsection.
3.1 Recursivity
Notice that the Lagrangean problem (10) looks like a social welfare function maximization.
The only difference with a standard one is the fact that Pareto weights change through time.
This feature can be exploited to show that the original problem has a recursive formulation.
By duality theory (see for example Luenberger (1969)), a solution of the original prob-
lem corresponds to a saddle point of the Lagrangean, i.e. the contract W∗ is a solution for
the original problem if there exist a sequence λ∗∞ ≡ {λ∗t (st) ∀st ∈ St+1}∞t=0 of Lagrange
multipliers such that (W∗, λ∗∞) satisfy:
L (s0, ω,W ′, λ∗∞) ≤ L (s0, ω,W∗, λ∗∞) ≤ L (s0, ω,W∗, λ′∞) ∀W ′, ∀λ′∞
Finding these sequences can be complicated. However, had this Lagrangean problem a recur-
sive representation, it would be possible to characterize the solutions with standard numerical
methods that exploit dynamic programming arguments. This is the focus of this section. In
particular, value and policy functions (or correspondences, more generally) are shown to de-
pend on the state of the world st, the vector of endogenous state variables xt (st) and the
Pareto-Negishi weights φt (st).
Let ϕi (φi, λi, ai, s′) ≡ φi +λi pi
i
a(s′i|si,ai)
pii(s′i|si,ai)
, hi0 (ς, a, x, s) ≡ ri (ςi, ai, xi, s), hi1 (ς, a, x, s) ≡
ria (ςi, ai, xi, s), and
h (ς, a, x, φ, λ, s) ≡ φh0 (ς, a, x, s) + λh1 (ς, a, x, s)
which is homogeneous of degree 1 in (φ, λ). The Lagrangean can be written as:
L (s0, ω, ς
∞, a∞, x∞, λ∞) =
∞∑
t=0
∑
st
βth (ςt, at, xt, φt, λt, st) Π
(
st | s0, at−1
(
st−1
))
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where
xt+1
(
st, ŝ
)
= `
(
xt
(
st
)
, ςt
(
st
)
, ŝ
)
φt+1
(
st, ŝ
)
= ϕ
(
φt
(
st
)
, λt
(
st
)
, at
(
st
)
, ŝ
) ∀st ∈ St+1,∀ŝ ∈ S
φ0
(
s0
)
= ω, xi0 given
We need to show that all solutions of the Lagrangean have a recursive structure, and
that can be solved with standard dynamic programming techniques. This is done in two
steps. Firstly, Proposition 1 proves that, under the assumption that there is a unique allocation
that solves the original problem, a particular functional equation (the saddle point functional
equation) associated with the Lagrangean satisfies the assumptions of the Contraction Map-
ping Theorem18. This functional equation is the equivalent of a Bellman equation for saddle
point problems. Secondly, it must hold that solutions of the functional equation are solutions
of the Lagrangean and viceversa. The latter is a trivial application of MM (Theorems 3 and
4) and therefore the proof is omitted19.
The saddle point functional equation associated with the Lagrangean is
J (s, φ, x) = min
λ
max
ς,a
{
h (ς, a, x, φ, λ, s) + β
∑
s′
pi (s′ | s, a) J (s′, φ′ (s′) , x′ (s′))
}
(13)
s.t. x′ (s′) = ` (x, ς, s′)
φ′ (s′) = ϕ (φ, λ, a, s′) ∀s′
18In general, this problem will yield a unique value function and a policy correspondence. In the rest of the
paper, assume the policy correspondence is single-valued, i.e. it is a policy function. Messner and Pavoni (2004)
show an example with full information in which the policy function that solves the saddle point functional equa-
tion can be suboptimal or even infeasible. This happens more generally when the Pareto frontier of the problem
is not strictly concave, i.e. it presents flat spots, and therefore even if the planner value is uniquely determined,
agents’ individual continuation values are in fact indeterminate. Cole and Kubler (2012) get around this prob-
lem by using an additional state variable, which is the realization of a end-of-period lottery over the extreme
values on the flat part of the Pareto frontier, hence combining together aspects of MM and APS methodologies.
Marimon, Messner, and Pavoni (2011) generalize the arguments of MM for policy correspondence by using the
sign of the last positive Lagrange multiplier as an additional co-state variable, and similar ideas can be used in
the repeatead moral hazard setup.
19When the solution for allocations is unique, then Marcet and Marimon (2011) shows that the “promise-
keeping” equations of the form
U i (s, x, φ) = ri (ςi, ai, xi, s) + β
∑
s′
pi (s′ | s, a)U i (s′, x′, φ′s′)) ∀ i, (s, x, φ)
hold for optimality, where U i (s, x, φ) is the continuation value of agent i at state (s, x, φ). If allocations are not
uniquely determined, those equations must be imposed for optimality. Although for the proof of Proposition 1
we assume that allocations are uniquely determined and therefore we do not need to impose these equations, we
include them in the numerical algorithm.
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Candidate value functions will be taken from the following space of functions:
M =
{
f : S × RN ×X −→ R s.t.
a) f (s, ·, ·) is continuous, and f (s, ·, φ) is bounded when ‖φ‖ ≤ 1
b) f (s, x, ·) is convex and homogeneous of degree 1 }
with norm
‖f‖ = sup {|f (s, φ, x)| : ‖φ‖ ≤ 1, s ∈ S, x ∈ X}
We first need to establish a few preliminary results, which are simple applications of Lemmata
in Marcet and Marimon (2011) and therefore the proof is omitted:
1. M is a complete metric space;
2. Functions from the setM are differentiable in φ (thanks to Euler’s formula), and can be
represented as f (s, φ, x) = φU (s, x, φ), where U (s, φ, x) ≡ {U i (s, φ, x)}Ni=1 are the
agents’ continuation values. Therefore, agents’ continuation values are homogeneous
of degree zero in φ;
3. Optimal Lagrange multipliers are uniformly bounded, i.e., there exists a K such that,
for any (s, φ, x), we have ‖λ∗(s, φ, x)‖ ≤ K ‖φ‖. Together with the assumption of
bounded likelihood ratios (i.e., there exists a D ∈ R+ for which
∥∥∥∥piia(s′i|s′i,ai)pii(s′i|s′i,ai)
∥∥∥∥ ≤ D),
this implies that, for any s′, we have ‖φ′(s′)‖ ≤ (1 + KD)‖φ‖, i.e. the feasibility
correspondence generated by the law of motion for Pareto weights is compact-valued.
Proposition 1 shows that the operator on the RHS of (13) is a contraction. There are two
technical differences with the original framework in MM. Firstly, the law of motion for
Pareto-Negishi weights depends (non-linearly) on the current allocation, while in MM it only
depends (linearly) on the Lagrange multipliers. Secondly, the probability distribution of the
future states is endogenous and depends on the optimal effort at (st). Therefore, on a first
inspection, the problem looks much more complicated than the standard MM setup. How-
ever, Proposition 1 shows that MM’s arguments also work here: Blackwell’s conditions are
satisfied, and therefore the operator is a contraction.
Proposition 1. The operator
(Tf) (s, φ, x) ≡ min
λ
max
ς,a
{
h (ς, a, x, φ, λ, s) + β
∑
s′
pi (s′ | s, a) f (s′, φ′ (s′) , x′ (s′))
}
s.t. x′ (s′) = ` (x, ς, s′)
φ′ (s′) = ϕ (φ, λ, a, s′) ∀s′
is a contraction.
Proof. See Appendix A
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This result therefore establishes the existence of a unique value function that solves the saddle
point functional equation. Theorem 3 and 4 in MM guarantee that, provided that the optimal
policy correspondence for allocations is single-valued, a recursive solution of Problem (13)
is a solution of the Lagrangean, and more importantly it is a solution of the original problem.
As a consequence, it is enough to restrict the search for optimal contracts to the set of policy
functions that are Markovian in the states (s, φ, x) ∈ S × RN ×X .
Notice that this problem has N(m + 1) endogenous state variables. However, the value
function of the problem is homogeneous of degree one in the vector of endogenous weights
φ and individual continuation values for each agent i are homogeneous of degree zero with
respect to the vector of endogenous weights φ . This fact implies:
1
φ1
J (s, φ1, ..., φN , x) = J
(
s, 1,
φ2
φ1
, ...,
φN
φ1
, x
)
≡ J˜
(
s,
φ2
φ1
, ...,
φN
φ1
, x
)
(14)
U i (s, φ1, ..., φN , x) = U
i
(
s, 1,
φ2
φ1
, ...,
φN
φ1
, x
)
≡ U˜ i
(
s,
φ2
φ1
, ...,
φN
φ1
, x
)
∀i (15)
therefore the dimension of the state space can be reduced to N(m + 1) − 1. This result is
sometimes helpful in computational applications, and it is exploited in the example in the
next section.
4 A numerical example
In this section, I describe the algorithm and I provide one computed example of a production
economy with two agents. This example features two agents and two endogenous state vari-
ables (capital for each agent). It is therefore a challenging problem with the APS approach,
and I am not aware of any paper that solves a similarly complicated model. However, it turns
out that it is a relatively easy model for the Lagrangean approach. The proposed algorithm
can find a quite accurate solution in less than 20 minutes on a state-of-the-art laptop.
4.1 The algorithm
Here I describe the algorithm for the general setup in section 3. Define a generic state of the
economy as ŝ ∈ S where S ≡ N×
i=1
Si. For simplicity, assume the shocks are not persistent,
and let pi (ŝ | at) ≡ pi (st+1 = ŝ | at) =
∏N
i=1 pi
i (si,t+1 = ŝi | ait). The numerical procedure
is a collocation algorithm (see Judd (1998)) over the first-order conditions of the Lagrangean.
From the recursive formulation we know that policy functions depend on the natural states
of the problem and on the costates (i.e., Pareto weights) that come out from the Lagrangean
approach. The algorithm therefore is the following:
1. Fix ωi, i = 1, ..., N and define a discrete grid G ⊂ S ×X ×RN+ for natural states and
costates.
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2. Approximate policy functions for allocations ς , hidden actions a, Lagrange multipliers
λ, the value function of the principal J and agents’ continuation value U i using cubic
splines or Chebychev polynomials, and set initial conditions for the approximation
coefficients.
3. For any (s, x, φ) ∈ G, use a non-linear solver 20 to solve for the Lagrangean first order
conditions and the following equations for the continuation value U i and the value
function J :
U i (s, x, φ) = ri (ςi, ai, xi, s) + β
∑
ŝ
pi (ŝ | a)U i (ŝ, x′, φ′(ŝ)) (16)
J (s, x, φ) = h (ς, a, x, φ, λ, s) + β
∑
ŝ
pi (ŝ | a) J (ŝ, x′, φ′(ŝ)) (17)
I use the Miranda-Fackler Compecon toolbox for function approximation. Steps 1-3 are
applied first to a grid with very few gridpoints, and then the accuracy of the approximation is
increased by applying steps 1-3 to a finer grid. Typically, a good approximation is obtained
with few grid points. Due to the use of a non-linear equation solver, it is crucial to find good
initial conditions for the parameters of the interpolants. In general, it is a good idea to start
from the solution of a simpler model. Homotopy methods help if the latter is not enough.
The algorithm is coded in Matlab21.
4.2 Risk sharing in a production economy
The proposed example is a production economy in which two agents (or countries, depending
on the interpretation) must share their income. For simplicity of the notation, I omit the de-
pendence on the history, hence a generic variable wit is to be read as wit (st). In each period,
they produce output yit with their own capital kit. However, the production function is sub-
ject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks, the distribution of which is affected by unobservable
effort ait. The production function is
f(kit) = Aitk
ρi
it
where Ait is the i.i.d. productivity shock (hence, in terms of the notation of section 3, we
have st = (A1tA2t). I assume that each Ait can assume only two possible values
{
ALi , A
H
i
}
and the probability of the high realization is given by pi (ait) = aνiit , ait ∈ (0, 1), where νi
is a parameter that can possibly differ between agents. Agents accumulate capital according
to the following standard law of motion:
ki,t+1 = Aitk
ρi
it − cit + (1− δi)kit
20I use a version of the Broyden algorithm coded by Michael Reiter.
21The basic code can be downloaded from my website (where the interested reader can find other examples
included in a previous version of the paper) or I can send it by email.
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The utility function is given by
u (cit)− υ (ait) = c
1−σi
it
1− σi − αia
εi
it
The baseline parameters are summarized in the following table:
αi εi νi σi A
L
i A
H
i β ωi δi ρi k
i
0
0.05 2 0.1 2 0.45 0.55 0.95 0.5 0.06 0.3 3.1
We can now define the Pareto problem for the planner. The feasibility constraint becomes
2∑
i=1
(cit + ki,t+1 − (1− δi) kit) ≤
2∑
i=1
Aitf (kit)
The Pareto-constrained allocation can be found by solving:
P (s0, k0) = max{{cit,ait,kit}i=1,2}∞t=0
{
Eat
2∑
i=1
∞∑
t=0
βtωi [u (cit)− υ (ait)]
}
s.t. υ′
(
ait
(
st
))
= Eat+1
∞∑
j=1
βj
piai (si,t+1 | sit, ait)
pi (si,t+1 | sit, ait) [u (ci,t+j)− υ (ai,t+j)](18)
2∑
i=1
(cit + ki,t+1 − (1− δi) kit) ≤
2∑
i=1
Aitf (kit)
where the expectational operator Eat uses the probability distribution defined by pi (ait). We
can now write down the Lagrangean of this problem. We first substitute the feasibility con-
straint in the objective function. Let λit (st) be the Lagrange multiplier of (18) for agent i,
then the Lagrangean is:
L (ς∞, λ∞, k∞, φ∞) =
=
2∑
i=1
∞∑
t=0
∑
st
βt
{
φit
(
st
) [
u
(
cit
(
st
))− υ (ait (st))] −
−λit
(
st
)
υ′
(
ait
(
st
))}
Π
(
st | s0, at−1
(
st−1
))
where
φi,t+1
(
st, st+1
)
= φit
(
st
)
+ λit
(
st
) piai (si,t+1 | sit, ait (st))
pi (si,t+1 | sit, ait (st))
φi0 (s0) = ωi
and recursivity is therefore obtained by using φit and kit as state variables. Therefore the
state variables are 5 (the 4 endogenous states plus the state of nature). However, it is possible
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to reduce the number of states by using the homogeneity properties of the value functions.
Remember from equation (14) in section 3 that the planner’s value function is homogeneous
of degree one. Moreover, given that the continuation value U i of each agent is the derivative
of the planner’s value function with respect to φi, then U i is homogeneous of degree zero by
Euler’s theorem with respect to the Pareto-Negishi weights. Hence it is possible to derive the
Lagrangean first-order conditions and rewrite them as a function of the Pareto weights’ ratio
Φt ≡ φ2tφ1t , thus reducing the number of states to 3 endogenous states and one state of nature
(the steps to obtain this simplification are available upon request).
4.3 Computational speed and accuracy
The following table present results for several performance tests. In order to test the com-
putational speed of the algorithm and the accuracy of the approximated solution, the codes
solve the examples for different number of grid points, using orthogonal collocation with
Chebichev polynomials. Let M be the number of grid points in each dimension of the state
space, e.g. with three endogenous states the grid has a total of M3 grid points. The Miranda-
Fackler Compecon toolbox automatically chooses the degree of the polynomials equal to the
number of grid points, and the gridpoints to be the zeros of the Chebichev polynomials.
The general message of this exercise is that it is possible to get an accurate solution in few
seconds even with relatively few grid points. The hardware is a 64-bit laptop with a processor
Intel Core i7-2640 at 2.80 GHz and 6 GB RAM. The accuracy of the approximated solution
can be tested by defining a large grid (with 463 = 97336 linearly spaced grid points) and
calculating the error of the Lagrangean first-order conditions for each grid point under the
approximated solution. In the following table, there are two statistics that measure accuracy:
the maximum error and the norm of the error vector. These statistics are calculated at the
absolute value, and at the free-unit value. The latter is calculated by using the Bellman
equation of each agent, and defining the unit-free Bellman equation error BEEi for agent i
as:
BEE ≡
[
(1− σ) (υ(ai)− β
∑
s′ U
i (Φ′, k′, s′))
1
1−σ + U i (Φ, k, s)
]
ci
− 1 (19)
The interpretation in terms of consumption is then straightforward: if BEE = .01, then the
solution is making a mistake of 0.01 for every unit of consumption. In general, free-unit and
absolute errors are similar and very small.
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Table 1: Speed and Accuracy
Grid Time (sec) Max Error Norm(Error) Max Error (FU) Norm Error (FU)
2 2.56 2.718581e-02 4.103847e+00 7.179348e-03 9.106260e-01
4 9.92 1.317713e-04 2.097053e-02 3.351783e-05 4.317211e-03
6 39.20 8.078817e-07 1.250894e-04 2.380975e-07 2.259080e-05
7 87.66 4.455317e-07 2.805273e-05 1.421670e-07 4.145154e-06
8 209.29 4.563646e-07 2.558593e-05 1.206049e-07 3.468939e-06
9 486.82 8.332295e-07 4.427910e-05 1.328316e-07 4.171927e-06
10 1152.13 3.854335e-07 2.926761e-05 6.606006e-08 3.322667e-06
Table 1 shows that it is possible to obtain a good accuracy (of the order of less than 10−6)
even with few grid points. Computational time is very low (less than 20 minutes with 10
grid points per dimension). The performance of the algorithm could be plausibly improved
by combining collocation with the Smolyak algorithm (see for example Malin, Krueger, and
Kubler (2011)). In particular, Smolyak can be useful for more complicated models , since it is
well known that the collocation method does not perform well for state spaces with more than
3 endogenous state variables. Another useful technique that can help in large dimensional
problems is the endogenous grid method of Judd, Maliar, and Maliar (2010), which can be
applied to problems with more than 2 agents. Judd, Maliar, and Maliar (2010) show how to
choose a non-rectangular grid in the ergodic set of the model at hand, dramatically reducing
the number of grid points needed for a good accuracy. They produce examples of risk sharing
models with hundred of agents and state variables, solved with collocation techniques.
5 Discussion
In this section I provide a more detailed comparison of APS and the Lagrangean approach for
dynamic agency problems. In particular, the two methodologies differ in the way in which
they make the problem recursive and the computational complexity for finding a solution of
the recursive problem. I then discuss the applicability of the Lagrangean approach.
5.1 Keeping promises in APS vs MM
In order to be able to compare the two methodologies, APS is shortly described in the follow-
ing lines. The promised utility approach gives a recursive formulation which uses a new state
space including continuation values U it and the natural states variables xt of the problem:
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P
(
{Ui, xi}i=1,...,N , s
)
= max{{ςi,a∗i ,{U i(s′),x′i(s′)}s′∈S}i=1,...,N}{[∑
i
ωir
i (ςi, a
∗
i , xi, s)
]
+ β
∑
s′
pi (s′ | s, a∗)P
({
U i (s′) , x′i (s
′)
}
i=1,...,N
, s′
)}
s.t. ri (ςi, a
∗
i , xi, s) + β
∑
s′
pi (s′ | s, a∗)U i (s′) = Ui i = 1, ..., N (20)
a∗i = arg max
ai∈Ai
{
ri (ςi, ai, xi, s) + β
∑
s′
pi
(
s′ | s, (ai, a∗−i)
)
U i (s′)
}
i = 1, ..., N
(21)
x′i (s
′) = `i (xi, ςi, s′) i = 1, ..., N, p (x, ς, a∗, s) ≥ 0 ∀s ∈ S,{{
U i (s′) , x′i (s
′)
}
i=1,..,N
}
s′∈S
∈ U (22)
where (20) is the promise-keeping constraint, (21) is the incentive compatibility constraint.
APS therefore “recursifies” the problem by using the continuation values of the agents.
The planner promises a higher continuation values for higher realizations of the state of na-
ture. In order to make sure that promises are kept, the promise keeping (which is absent in
the original problem) constraint must be satisfied: this constraint plays the role of the law
of motion for the continuation values. For simplicity, imagine again that we only have two
possible states of nature for each agent: “good” and “bad”. Therefore, given the current con-
tinuation value, the optimal contract will promise a future continuation value that is higher
than the current one if tomorrow is “good”, and lower if tomorrow is “bad”. This seems anal-
ogous to the recursive Lagrangean approach, where the promises were implemented by using
higher or lower Pareto-Negishi weights. Intuitively, Pareto-Negishi weights and continuation
values are two ways of fulfilling the same purpose: rewarding or punishing the agents for
their effort. However, even if the two methodologies look similar in the way they implement
incentive compatibility, there are remarkable differences for finding a solution.
5.2 Computational differences
The set U is the feasible set for continuation values. APS showed that it can be obtained by
iterating on a particular set-valued operator defined as
B (W ) =

(
{Ui, xi}i=1,..,N
)
|∃
({
{U i (s′) , x′i (s′)}i=1,..,N
}
s′∈S
)
∈ W :
ri (ςi, a
∗
i , xi, s) + β
∑
s′ pi (s
′ | s, a∗)U i (s′) = Ui
a∗i = arg maxai∈Ai
{
ri (ςi, ai, xi, s) + β
∑
s′ pi
(
s′ | s, (ai, a∗−i)
)
U i (s′)
}
x′i (s
′) = `i (xi, ςi, s′) i = 1, ..., N, p (x, ς, a∗, s) ≥ 0 ∀s ∈ S

This operator transforms sets W in new sets W ′. The contribution of APS is to show that the
sequence of sets Wt generated by iterating on the operator B converges to the set of feasible
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payoffs of the original problem. Hence, when applying APS technique to a dynamic agency
problem, one needs to characterize the feasible set for continuation values by solving the fixed
point problem B (U) = U , while in the recursive Lagrangean approach the problem is well
defined for any vector of Pareto-Negishi weights inRN+ . Therefore, because of this additional
step in the promised utilities method, the Lagrangean approach is generally simpler than the
APS one.
Moreover, the dimensionality of the feasible set U is given by N(m + 1), where N is
the number of agents, and m is the dimensionality of the state space for each agent. The
computational task therefore is to pick every possible combination of continuation values
and states that belong to an initial set W0, apply to them the operator B (W0) repeatedly
until convergence. While there are various algorithms that perform this task in an efficient
way (e.g. Sleet and Yeltekin (2007)), the problem is a nightmare even for low N and m. It
is easy to see that for the simple model in section 2 the correspondence U is actually one
interval. However, in the more general framework presented in section 3 with N agents with
endogenous states x ∈ X , there are N different intervals for each point of the natural state
space X , i.e. this feasible set for continuation values is the multidimensional graph of a
correspondence. Computing this correspondence is already a formidable task for the case
N + m = 3. Hence, the complexity of the task increases exponentially with the number
of agents and the number of endogenous state variables. This does not happen with the
Lagrangean approach, where the characterization of the feasible set is absent. While the
Lagrangean approach can potentially be applied to frameworks with hundreds of agents and
state variables, the APS technique is much more limited and I am not aware, to the best of
my knowledge, of any paper that solves a case with N +m = 4.
The second difference concerns the number of choice variables and the constraints in-
volved in the dynamic program22. Imagine there are I possible states of nature. Then, in
both approaches, for any point in the state space one needs to compute allocations ς , hidden
actions a and endogenous states x′ (s′). However, in APS N × I continuation values (one for
each agent and for each future state of nature) must be found, while with my approach it is
sufficient to calculate the N values in λ in order to have the full set of future Pareto weights
worked out. Moreover, in APS the maximization problem involves N more constraints (the
promise keeping constraint (20) for each agent). Hence, in APS the maximization step of
each iteration of the dynamic programming algorithm involves N(I − 1) additional variables
to be computed and N additional constraints with respect to the Lagrangean approach. It is
then easy to see that this feature becomes relevant in terms of computational complexity and
speed as N and I become large.
5.3 Applicability
There are two main caveats to the recursive Lagrangean method for dynamic agency prob-
lems: the applicability of the technique, and its local nature.
22I would like to thank an anonymous referee that pointed out this crucial advantage to me.
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5.3.1 Hidden endogenous states
Proposition 1 refers to cases in which all the endogenous state variables are observable. How-
ever, there are many situations that are better modelled with unobservable endogenous states.
One important contribution in this respect is the work of Abraham and Pavoni (2008) about
dynamic agency with hidden savings, where they use APS techniques and the first order ap-
proach. In principle, it is possible to follow the same general idea of combining the first-order
approach and the recursive Lagrangean for these models: solve the agent’s maximization
problem with respect to all unobservable variables by taking first-order conditions, and use
the latter as constraints in the planner’s problem. In general, first-order conditions for unob-
servable state variables will be forward-looking, and hence they will fit in the standard MM
framework.
However, there is a big caveat: the use of the first-order approach in these models is very
restrictive (see Kocherlakota (2004) for an example). Moreover, to the best of my knowl-
edge, there are no sufficient conditions that make sure the first-order approach is justified in
dynamic models with unobservable endogenous states. One possibility is to verify numeri-
cally if the first-order approach is valid, along the lines of the verification algorithm suggested
by Abraham and Pavoni (2008)23.
Recursive Lagrangean techniques must therefore be used with caution for these models.
Even if an ex-post verification algorithm can tell if the solution satisfies incentive compati-
bility, it should be thought as a tool for validating the use of FOA when one has already a
reasonable expectation that FOA would work. It is indeed a risky strategy to start using the
Lagrangean approach just to discover that the FOA is not valid in that particular application
or, even worse, with that particular calibration that matches data.
Nevertheless, the recent work of Abraham, Koehne, and Pavoni (2011) on two-period
repeated moral hazard with hidden savings suggests a proof strategy for the validity of FOA
in multiperiod models that could potentially be pursued for specific applications.
5.3.2 Local vs global
The second caveat is that the numerical algorithm is a local method, since it is based on Kuhn-
Tucker necessary conditions. One can check if, starting from different initial conditions, the
algorithm always delivers the same solution. This indeed is a standard check in dynamic
optimal taxation literature. However, such a procedure does not guarantee that the solution is
a global optimum.
This problem can be addressed if one is ready to compromise speed with global results.
The suggested algorithm is not the only way to find a solution. The main benefit of the algo-
rithm is its speed and the simple implementation, however the big advantage of the recursive
Lagrangean approach (the absence of a characterization step for the feasible set of costate
variables) does not depend on it. If one has a strong reason to believe that the Kuhn-Tucker
conditions are not sufficient, the saddle point can be found by iterating over the value function
23A previous version of the paper presented the model with hidden savings and solved it with Lagrangean
techniques. The Matlab code is available upon request.
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and using a global optimization procedure (e.g., direct search or genetic algorithms). While
this computational strategy would loose the gains in terms of speed, it still retains the ad-
vantage of not needing a characterization of the costates’ feasible set. With modern parallel
computing tools, the cost to pay might not be excessively high.
6 Conclusions
The use of recursive Lagrangeans as a solution strategy is common for dynamic environment
with full information, but not for private information setups. Sleet and Yeltekin (2008) open
the way for applications with privately observed shocks. This paper does the same for models
with privately observed actions, and in particular proposes an algorithm which is much faster
than the traditional APS technique. This methodology allows the researcher to deal with
models with many states, and to calibrate simulated series to real data in a reasonable amount
of time. A large class of models which are practically intractable under standard techniques
can be easily addressed with the techniques discussed here.
This method has many possible applications. Given the speed, the algorithm can also
be useful (as a time-saving technique) for solving those models that are tractable with tra-
ditional techniques, but computationally burdensome. These techniques can be potentially
helpful in the analysis of several issues such as e.g. consumption-saving anomalies, optimal
unemployment insurance with assets accumulation or DSGE models with financial frictions.
However, the main gain of the Lagrangean method can be seen in more complicated
setups, which are practically intractable with current state-of-the-art algorithms. Models of
repeated moral hazard with heterogeneous agents and endogenous states are a good example:
they require us to solve the problem of each agent and aggregate the resulting individual
optimal choices, before iterating until a general equilibrium is found. In these cases, APS
techniques are unmanageable even with just two endogenous states, while with my approach
it is a simple computational task. Other problems for which the Lagrangean approach has a
potential advantage are optimal taxation theory in economies with hidden effort and several
assets, models of CEO compensation, and models of banking and credit markets.
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A Proof of Proposition 1
The proof strategy is to show that the operator T mapsM into itself, and then that Blackwell’s
conditions of discounting and monotonicity are satisfied for T .
In order to show that T : M −→M , notice that
(Tf) (s, φ, x) = φh0 (ς
∗, a∗, x∗, s)+λ∗h1 (ς∗, a∗, x∗, s)+β
∑
s′
pi (s′ | s, a∗) f
(
s′, φ∗
′
(s′) , x∗
′
(s′)
)
hence by Schwartz’s inequality
‖(Tf) (s, φ, x)‖ ≤ ‖φ‖ ‖h0 (ς∗, a∗, x∗, s)‖+K ‖φ‖ ‖h1 (ς∗, a∗, x∗, s)‖
+ β
(
K ‖φ‖
∥∥∥∥pia (s′ | s, a∗)pi (s′ | s, a∗)
∥∥∥∥+ ‖φ‖)∥∥∥∥f (s′, φ∗′ (s′)‖φ∗′ (s′)‖ , x∗′ (s′)
)∥∥∥∥
and therefore (Tf) (s, φ, x) is bounded. A generalized Maximum Principle argument gives
continuity of (Tf) (s, φ, x). To check for homogeneity properties, let (ς∗, a∗, x∗, λ∗) be such
that
(Tf) (s, φ, x) = h (ς∗, a∗, x∗, φ, λ∗, s) + β
∑
s′
pi (s′ | s, a∗) f
(
s′, φ∗
′
(s′) , x∗
′
(s′)
)
Then for any α > 0 we get
α (Tf) (s, φ, x) = α
[
h (ς∗, a∗, x∗, φ, λ∗, s) + β
∑
s′
pi (s′ | s, a∗) f
(
s′, φ∗
′
(s′) , x∗
′
(s′)
)]
Therefore
h (ς∗, a∗, x∗, αφ, αλ∗, s) + β
∑
s′
pi (s′ | s, a∗) f
(
s′, αφ∗
′
(s′) , x∗
′
(s′)
)
=
= α
[
h (ς∗, a∗, x∗, φ, λ∗, s) + β
∑
s′
pi (s′ | s, a∗) f
(
s′, φ∗
′
(s′) , x∗
′
(s′)
)]
(23)
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Now take a generic λ and notice that we can write:
h (ς∗, a∗, x∗, αφ, λ, s) + β
∑
s′
pi (s′ | s, a∗) f
(
s′, ϕ (αφ, λ, a∗, s′) , x∗
′
(s′)
)
= α
[
h
(
ς∗, a∗, x∗, φ,
λ
α
, s
)
+ β
∑
s′
pi (s′ | s, a∗) f
(
s′,
ϕ (αφ, λ, a∗, s′)
α
, x∗
′
(s′)
)]
(by homogeneity)
≥ α
[
h (ς∗, a∗, x∗, φ, λ∗, s) + β
∑
s′
pi (s′ | s, a∗) f
(
s′, φ∗′ (s′) , x∗
′
(s′)
)]
(by definition of saddle point)
≥ α
[
h (ς, a, x, φ, λ∗, s) + β
∑
s′
pi (s′ | s, a) f (s′, ϕ (φ, λ∗, a, s′) , x′ (s′))
]
and using (23)
(Tf) (s, αφ, x) = h (ς∗, a∗, x∗, αφ, αλ∗, s) + β
∑
s′
pi (s′ | s, a∗) f
(
s′, αφ∗
′
(s′) , x∗
′
(s′)
)
= α (Tf) (s, φ, x)
and therefore the operator preserves the homogeneity properties. Convexity is then obvious.
To see monotonicity, let g, u ∈M such that g ≤ u. Therefore
max
ς,a
{
h (ς, a, x, φ, λ, s) + β
∑
s′
pi (s′ | s, a) g (s′, φ′ (s′) , x′ (s′))
}
≤ max
ς,a
{
h (ς, a, x, φ, λ, s) + β
∑
s′
pi (s′ | s, a)u (s′, φ′ (s′) , x′ (s′))
}
and then
min
λ
max
ς,a
{
h (ς, a, x, φ, λ, s) + β
∑
s′
pi (s′ | s, a) g (s′, φ′ (s′) , x′ (s′))
}
≤ min
λ
max
ς,a
{
h (ς, a, x, φ, λ, s) + β
∑
s′
pi (s′ | s, a)u (s′, φ′ (s′) , x′ (s′))
}
which implies (Tg) (s, φ, x) ≤ (Tu) (s, φ, x).
To see discounting, let k ∈ R+. Therefore, for any λ > 0:
max
ς,a
{
h (ς, a, x, φ, λ, s) + β
∑
s′
pi (s′ | s, a) (g + k) (s′, φ′ (s′) , x′ (s′))
}
= max
ς,a
{
h (ς, a, x, φ, λ, s) + β
∑
s′
pi (s′ | s, a) g (s′, φ′ (s′) , x′ (s′)) + βk
∑
s′
pi (s′ | s, a) ‖ϕ (φ, λ, a, s′) ‖
}
≤ max
ς,a
{
h (ς, a, x, φ, λ, s) + β
∑
s′
pi (s′ | s, a) g (s′, φ′ (s′) , x′ (s′))
}
+ βk (1 +KD) ‖φ‖
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For any feasible (ς, a), let then λ̂ (ς, a) be the solution of
min
{λ:‖λ‖≤K‖φ‖}
{
h (ς, a, x, φ, λ, s) + β
∑
s′
pi (s′ | s, a) (g + k) (s′, φ′ (s′) , x′ (s′))
}
= h
(
ς, a, x, φ, λ̂ (ς, a) , s
)
+ β
∑
s′
pi (s′ | s, a) g
(
s′, ϕ
(
φ, λ̂ (ς, a) , a, s′
)
, x′ (s′)
)
+
+ βk
∑
s′
pi (s′ | s, a) ‖ϕ
(
φ, λ̂ (ς, a) , a, s′
)
‖
≤ h
(
ς, a, x, φ, λ̂ (ς, a) , s
)
+ β
∑
s′
pi (s′ | s, a) g
(
s′, ϕ
(
φ, λ̂ (ς, a) , a, s′
)
, x′ (s′)
)
+
+ βk (1 +KD) ‖φ‖
For any feasible (ς, a), let then λ∗ (ς, a) be the solution of
min
{λ:‖λ‖≤K‖φ‖}
{
h (ς, a, x, φ, λ, s) + β
∑
s′
pi (s′ | s, a) (g) (s′, φ′ (s′) , x′ (s′))
}
= h (ς, a, x, φ, λ∗ (ς, a) , s) + β
∑
s′
pi (s′ | s, a) g (s′, ϕ (φ, λ∗ (ς, a) , a, s′) , x′ (s′))
Therefore we can write
h
(
ς, a, x, φ, λ̂ (ς, a) , s
)
+ β
∑
s′
pi (s′ | s, a) g
(
s′, ϕ
(
φ, λ̂ (ς, a) , a, s′
)
, x′ (s′)
)
+
+ βk (1 +KD) ‖φ‖
≤ h (ς, a, x, φ, λ∗ (ς, a) , s) + β
∑
s′
pi (s′ | s, a) g (s′, ϕ (φ, λ∗ (ς, a) , a, s′) , x′ (s′)) +
+ βk (1 +KD) ‖φ‖
Hence we get
T (f + k) (s, φ, x) =
= min
λ
max
ς,a
{
h (ς, a, x, φ, λ, s) + β
∑
s′
pi (s′ | s, a) (f + k) (s′, φ′ (s′) , x′ (s′))
}
≤ h (ς∗, a∗, x, φ, λ∗ (ς∗, a∗) , s) + β
∑
s′
pi (s′ | s, a∗) f (s′, ϕ (φ, λ∗ (ς∗, a∗) , a, s′) , x′ (s′)) +
+ βk (1 +KD) ‖φ‖
= T (f) (s, φ, x) + βk (1 +KD) ‖φ‖
and by homogeneity we can always choose a φ such that ‖φ‖ ≤ (1+KD)−1, finally obtaining
T (f + k) ≤ Tf + βk. Now it is possible to use the previous results to show the contraction
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property for the operator T . In order to see this, let f, g ∈M . By homogeneity, we get
f (s, φ, x) = g (s, φ, x) + f (s, φ, x)− g (s, φ, x)
≤ g (s, φ, x) + |f (s, φ, x)− g (s, φ, x)|
and then
f (s, φ, x) ≤ g (s, φ, x) + ‖f (s, φ, x)− g (s, φ, x)‖
Now applying the operator T and using monotonicity and discounting we get:
(Tf) (s, φ, x) ≤ T (g + ‖f − g‖) (s, φ, x)
≤ (Tg) (s, φ, x) + β ‖f − g‖
which implies finally
‖Tf − Tg‖ ≤ β ‖f − g‖
and given β ∈ (0, 1) this concludes the proof that the operator T is a contraction.
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